In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM – whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part 1 of this article took up the first two questions. Part 2 took up the second two questions. Part 3 now deals with Questions 5 & 6. Question 5 confronts the issue of utility, whether the manual design of DSM-III and IV favors clinicians or researchers, and what that means for DSM-5. Our final question, Question 6, takes up a concluding issue, whether the acknowledged problems with the earlier DSMs warrants a significant overhaul of DSM-5 and future manuals. As in Parts 1 & 2 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)

There has been much discussion of whether there could be objects A and B that are “individuatively vague” in the following way: object A and object B neither determinately stand in the relation of identity to one another, nor do they determinately fail to stand in this relation. If there are objects of this type, then we would have a genuine case of metaphysical vagueness, or “vagueness-in-the-world.” The possibility of vague objects in this sense strikes many as incoherent. The possibility’s (...) very description not only seems to talk of two objects but, much worse, it seems to point to a feature that distinguishes them: unlike object A, object B is not determinately identical to object A. This suspicion of incoherence is voiced in the famous arguments given against the possibility by Gareth Evans and Nathan Salmon. But the status of those arguments and others is uncertain. Here I present a new argument against vague objects — or more precisely, against the possibility of individuatively vague objects that satisfy an important and common additional condition that I will call “Democracy.” Since my argument turns on a connection between what is indeterminate and what is possible, I call it “the modal argument.”. (shrink)

_John Dewey and Continental Philosophy_ provides a rich sampling of exchanges that could have taken place long ago between the traditions of American pragmatism and continental philosophy had the lines of communication been more open between Dewey and his European contemporaries. Since they were not, Paul Fairfield and thirteen of his colleagues seek to remedy the situation by bringing the philosophy of Dewey into conversation with several currents in continental philosophical thought, from post-Kantian idealism and the work of Friedrich Nietzsche (...) to twentieth-century phenomenology, hermeneutics, and poststructuralism. This unique volume includes discussions comparing and contrasting Dewey with the German philosophers G. W. F. Hegel, Friedrich Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, and Hans-Georg Gadamer on such topics as phenomenology, naturalism, organicism, contextualism, and poetry. Others investigate a series of connections between Dewey and contemporary French philosophy, including the notions of subjectivity, education, and the critique of modernity in Michel Foucault; language and politics in Jacques Derrida; and the concept of experience in Gilles Deleuze. Also discussed is the question of whether we can identify traces of _Bildung_ in Dewey’s writings on education, and pragmatism’s complex relation to twentieth-century phenomenology and hermeneutics, including the problematic question of whether Heidegger was a pragmatist in any meaningful sense. Presented in intriguing pairings, these thirteen essays offer different approaches to the material that will leave readers with much to deliberate. _ John Dewey and Continental Philosophy_ demonstrates some of the many connections and opportunities for cross-traditional thinking that have long existed between Dewey and continental thought, but have been under-explored. The intersection presented here between Dewey’s pragmatism and the European traditions makes a significant contribution to continental and American philosophy and will spur new and important developments in the American philosophical debate. (shrink)

Each contributor to this book has used personal experience as the basis from which to frame his individual sociological perspectives. Because they have personalized their work, their accounts are real, and recognizable as having come from 'real' persons, about 'real' experiences. There are no objectively-distanced disembodied third person entities in these accounts. These writers are actual people whose stories will make you laugh, cry, think, and want to know more.

In the conclusion to this multi-part article I first review the discussions carried out around the six essential questions in psychiatric diagnosis – the position taken by Allen Frances on each question, the commentaries on the respective question along with Frances’ responses to the commentaries, and my own view of the multiple discussions. In this review I emphasize that the core question is the first – what is the nature of psychiatric illness – and that in some manner all further (...) questions follow from the first. Following this review I attempt to move the discussion forward, addressing the first question from the perspectives of natural kind analysis and complexity analysis. This reflection leads toward a view of psychiatric disorders – and future nosologies – as far more complex and uncertain than we have imagined. (shrink)

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article will take up the first two questions. With the first question, invited commentators express a range of opinion regarding the nature of psychiatric disorders, loosely divided into a realist position that the diagnostic categories represent real diseases that we can accurately name and know with our perceptual abilities, a middle, nominalist position that psychiatric disorders do exist in the real world but that our diagnostic categories are constructs that may or may not accurately represent the disorders out there, and finally a purely constructivist position that the diagnostic categories are simply constructs with no evidence of psychiatric disorders in the real world. The second question again offers a range of opinion as to how we should define a mental or psychiatric disorder, including the possibility that we should not try to formulate a definition. The general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)

In face of the multiple controversies surrounding the DSM process in general and the development of DSM-5 in particular, we have organized a discussion around what we consider six essential questions in further work on the DSM. The six questions involve: 1) the nature of a mental disorder; 2) the definition of mental disorder; 3) the issue of whether, in the current state of psychiatric science, DSM-5 should assume a cautious, conservative posture or an assertive, transformative posture; 4) the role (...) of pragmatic considerations in the construction of DSM-5; 5) the issue of utility of the DSM - whether DSM-III and IV have been designed more for clinicians or researchers, and how this conflict should be dealt with in the new manual; and 6) the possibility and advisability, given all the problems with DSM-III and IV, of designing a different diagnostic system. Part I of this article took up the first two questions. Part II will take up the second two questions. Question 3 deals with the question as to whether DSM-V should assume a conservative or assertive posture in making changes from DSM-IV. That question in turn breaks down into discussion of diagnoses that depend on, and aim toward, empirical, scientific validation, and diagnoses that are more value-laden and less amenable to scientific validation. Question 4 takes up the role of pragmatic consideration in a psychiatric nosology, whether the purely empirical considerations need to be tempered by considerations of practical consequence. As in Part 1 of this article, the general introduction, as well as the introductions and conclusions for the specific questions, are written by James Phillips, and the responses to commentaries are written by Allen Frances. (shrink)

Recall that B is PA relative to A if B computes a member of every nonempty $\Pi ^0_1(A)$ class. This two-place relation is invariant under Turing equivalence and so can be thought of as a binary relation on Turing degrees. Miller and Soskova [23] introduced the notion of a $\Pi ^0_1$ class relative to an enumeration oracle A, which they called a $\Pi ^0_1{\left \langle {A}\right \rangle }$ class. We study the induced extension of the relation B is PA relative (...) to A to enumeration oracles and hence enumeration degrees. We isolate several classes of enumeration degrees based on their behavior with respect to this relation: the PA bounded degrees, the degrees that have a universal class, the low for PA degrees, and the ${\left \langle {\text {self}\kern1pt}\right \rangle }$ -PA degrees. We study the relationship between these classes and other known classes of enumeration degrees. We also investigate a group of classes of enumeration degrees that were introduced by Kalimullin and Puzarenko [14] based on properties that are commonly studied in descriptive set theory. As part of this investigation, we give characterizations of three of their classes in terms of a special sub-collection of relativized $\Pi ^0_1$ classes—the separating classes. These three can then be seen to be direct analogues of three of our classes. We completely determine the relative position of all classes in question. (shrink)

Physical activity, and likely the motivation for it, varies throughout the day. The aim of this investigation was to create a short assessment (CRAVE: Cravings for Rest and Volitional Energy Expenditure) to measure motivation states (wants, desires, urges) for physical activity and sedentary behaviors. Five studies were conducted to develop and evaluate the construct validity and reliability of the scale, with 1,035 participants completing the scale a total of 1,697 times. In Study 1, 402 university students completed a questionnaire inquiring (...) about the want or desire to perform behaviors “at the present moment (right now).” Items related to physical activity (e.g., “move my body”) and sedentary behaviors (e.g., “do nothing active”). An exploratory structural equation model (ESEM) revealed that 10 items should be retained, loading onto two factors (5 each for Move and Rest). In Study 2, an independent sample (n= 444) confirmed these results and found that Move and Rest desires were associated with stage-of-change for exercise behavior. In Study 3, 127 community-residing participants completed the CRAVE at 6-month intervals over two years- two times each session. Across-session interclass correlations (ICC) for Move (ICC = 0.72–0.95) and Rest (ICC = 0.69–0.88) were higher than when they were measured across 24-months (Move: ICC = 0.53; Rest: ICC = 0.49), indicating wants/desires have state-like qualities. In Study 4, a maximal treadmill test was completed by 21 university students. The CRAVE was completed immediately pre and post. Move desires decreased 26% and Rest increased 74%. Changes in Move and Rest desires were moderately associated with changes in perceived physical fatigue and energy. In Study 5, 41 university students sat quietly during a 50-min lecture. They completed the CRAVE at 3 time points. Move increased 19.6% and Rest decreased 16.7%. Small correlations were detected between move and both perceived energy and tiredness, but not calmness or tension. In conclusion, the CRAVE scale has good psychometric properties. These data also support tenets of the WANT model of motivation states for movement and rest (Stults-Kolehmainen et al., 2020a). Future studies need to explore how desires to move/rest relate to dynamic changes in physical activity and sedentarism. (shrink)

We show that the Turing degrees are not sufficient to measure the complexity of continuous functions on [0, 1]. Computability of continuous real functions is a standard notion from computable analysis. However, no satisfactory theory of degrees of continuous functions exists. We introduce the continuous degrees and prove that they are a proper extension of the Turing degrees and a proper substructure of the enumeration degrees. Call continuous degrees which are not Turing degrees non-total. Several fundamental results are proved: a (...) continuous function with non-total degree has no least degree representation, settling a question asked by Pour-El and Lempp; every non-computable f $\epsilon \mathcal{C}[0, 1]$ computes a non-computable subset of $\mathbb{N}$ ; there is a non-total degree between Turing degrees $a _\eqslantless_{\tau}$ b iff b is a PA degree relative to a; $\mathcal{S} \subseteq 2^{\mathbb{N}}$ is a Scott set iff it is the collection of f-computable subsets of $\mathbb{N}$ for some f $\epsilon \mathcal{C}[O, 1]$ of non-total degree; and there are computably incomparable f, g $\epsilon \mathcal{C}[0, 1]$ which compute exactly the same subsets of $\mathbb{N}$ . Proofs draw from classical analysis and constructive analysis as well as from computability theory. (shrink)

Comments on the views on free will offered by B. D. Slife , M. Gergen , R. N. Williams , M. S. Richardson , and G. S. Howard in light of the classical definition of FW as being capable of doing otherwise. It is argued that FW interpretations differ markedly depending on whether they are viewed as due to a process or to contents within some process. 2012 APA, all rights reserved).

La cuestión de si los lenguajes intensionalesson más expresivos que los lenguajes nointensionalessurge en el marco de unaperspect i va semánt i ca de l as t eorí as.Desde esta perspectiva, la cuestión esesta. ¿Hay clases modelo que se puedencaracterizar mediante teorías que usanconceptos intensionales que no se puedencaracterizar mediante teorías que no usanconceptos intensionales? Se sugiere unaformulación precisa de esta cuestión, perono se ofrece una respuesta.Para aproxi marse a est a cuest i ón, seresume la teoría de modelos de (...) primerorden [II] y se revisa el enfoque semánticode las teorías que emplea incrementost eóri cos, no i nt ensi onal es, de pri merorden [III].Los i nc r e me nt os t e ór i c os de pr i me rorden se bosquejan pero no se definenr i g u r o s a me n t e [ I V] . E s t e l e n g u a j ei n t e n s i o n a l pr o po r c i o n a e l a p a r a t op a r a a t r i b u i r u s o d e l l e n g u a j e yact i t udes i nt ens i onal es a i ndi vi duoscuyo comportami ento es el obj eto deinvestigación. También proporciona elaparato para habl ar sobre traducci óndel lenguaj e atribuido al lenguaj e delinvestigador.La cuestión inicial se convierte entoncesen si hay clases modelo que se puedanc a r a c t e r i z a r me d i a n t e i n c r e me n t o sintencionales de lógica de primer ordenq ue n o pue de n s e r c a pt ur a do s po rincrementos teóricos no-intensionales [V].The ques t i on of whet her i nt ens i onallanguages are more expressive than nonintensional languages is raised within the framework of a semantic view of theories. Fromthis perspective, the question isthis. Are there model classes that can becharacterized by theories using intensionalconcepts that cannot be characterizedby theories that do not use intensionalconcepts? A precise formulation of thisquestion is suggested, but no answer isgiven.To approach this question, model theory offirst order theories is summarized [II] andthe semantic approach to theories usingnon-intensional, theoretical augmentationsof first order theories is reviewed [III].I n t e n s i o n a l a u g me n t a t i o n s o f f i r s torder theories are sketched [IV] but notr i gor ous l y de f i ne d. Thi s i nt e ns i onall anguage provi des t he apparat us f orattributing language use and intensionalattitudes to individuals whose behavioris the object investigation. It also providesapparatus for talking about translationf r om t he at t r i but e d l anguage t o t heinvestigator’s language.T h e i n i t i a l q u e s t i o n t h e n b e c o me swhet her t here are model cl asses t hatc a n be c ha r a c t e r i z e d by i nt e ns i ona laugmentations of first order logic thatcannot be captured by non-intensionaltheoretical augmentations [V]. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Joseph Margolis THE OPTIONS OF CONTEMPORARY ETHICAL THEORY It may be said, with some prospect ofbeing not altogether idiotic, that the global philosophical question ofour age concerns the possibility of legitimating the conceptual grounds for legitimating claims about anything. The formulation has no interest in the abstract. It merely registers the possibility of an infinite regress; and in that form it has been with us forever. But our (...) own world has inexorably subverted all the standard forms of confidence regarding legitimation—not so much perhaps by intellectual confrontation as, more indirectly, by coming to believe the deep contingencies of human history, by discovering again and again the astounding diversity of actual human societies, by reflecting on the incompletely managed self-manipulation of our immense technology, by the natural fear entailed in the growing chaos of the entire terrestrial world we mean to put into serviceable order. These considerations are certainly local to moral theorizing. But since they have a general currency as well, they lead us to suppose that speculations about legitimizing moral claims cannot be more satisfactory than those of philosophy in general, though they may be weaker. This, in its turn, encourages us to imagine that a reduced assessment of the larger claims of philosophy may conveniendy justify a greater respect for the inherendy modest prospects ofmoral theorizing. Furthermore, the characteristic triple thinking of our age, always incipient in any reflexive appraisal of cognitive powers, has been raised to a particularly fine art — if that is the right term. It is quite impossible nowadays, unless by a confidence or innocence bordering on the Martian, simply to proclaim the principles or grounds or foundations of moral judgment and moral commitment. Nevertheless, what one cannot help noticing is that wher37 38Philosophy and Literature ever theorists are morally serious — and they seem never more serious than when they are theorizing about morality— they are understandably inclined to believe that they absolutely must give some sense of the accessibility of reliable and valid grounds for judgments and commitments of the most important sorts. In yielding to that touching obligation to serve others in the capacity of philosopher, however, they usually yield as well in the direction ofinsinuating— ifnot openly announcing— what their own sense of professional history would otherwise have readily shown to be in desperate need of a smidgen of support. Notably in the last generation, the retreat from older forms of confidence, in moral philosophy, in philosophy in general, and in all those intellectual disciplines either pleased or displeased to be linked to the fate of philosophy, has decidedly accelerated. There is no resisting the current, though that is hardly to say we understand its implications or are obliged to subscribe to its madder exemplars. But when, to take a counter-specimen from the Anglo-American tradition of the last decade, a moral philosopher like Alan Donagan attempts to restore something like the Kantian moral system, we sense its unlikely and alien body even before we prepare our instruments for the required dissection. Thus, Donagan, who can hardly be accused of failing to sustain a most humane document, speaks at the beginning of The Theory ofMorality of his having been persuaded — by George Orwell and others — "that any acceptable form of social order, whether socialist or not, must rest on moral foundations, which are in principle ascertainable at any period, and permanendy valid."1 Donagan had hoped to recover in a compelling way the "common morality" of mankind, the rationally accessible portion of the Biblical tradition, presumably congruent with the classical tradition, ordered in a conceptually convincing way for the first time by Immanuel Kant reflecting, apparently, on his own Pietist upbringing. Donagan is, of course, among other things, a careful student of R. G. Collingwood's work, and here may be thought to exhibit Collingwood's confidence that the historian is capable, under favorable conditions, of "reenacting" at any period the motivating thought of effective historical agents of the past.2 At any rate, Donagan is quite explicit that: (a) social orders must have moral foundations or first principles; (b) social orders do have such moral foundations; (c) those foundations are ascertainable; (d) they are ascertainable in principle at... (shrink)

Introduction, by J. D. Bettis.--An introduction to phenomenology: What is phenomenology? by M. Merleau-Ponty.--The phenomenology of religion: The meaning of religion, by W. B. Kristensen.--A naturalistic description: Religion in essence and manifestation, by G. van der Leeuw.--A supernaturalistic description: Approaches to God, by J. Maritain.--A projective description: The essence of Christianity, by L. Feuerbach.--Religion as a faculty: On religion, by F. Schleiermacher. The Christian faith, by F. Schleiermacher.--Religion as a dimension: Religion as a dimension in man's spiritual life, by P. (...) Tillich.--Religion as a social function: Magic, science, and religion, by B. Malinowski.--Religion as structure and archetype: The sacred and the profane, by M. Eliade.--Religion as encounter: I and thou, by M. Buber. (shrink)

In [14] J. Hirschfeld established the close connection of models of the true AE sentences of Peano Arithmetic and homomorphic images of the semiring of recursive functions. This fragment of Arithmetic includes most of the familiar results of classical number theory. There are two nice ways that such models appear in the isols. One way was introduced by A. Nerode in [20] and is referred to in the literature as Nerode Semirings. The other way is called a tame model. It (...) is very similar to a Nerode Semiring and was introduced in [6]. The model theoretic properties of Nerode Semirings and tame models have been widely studied by T. G. McLaughlin ([16], [17], and [18]). In this paper we introduce a new variety of tame model called a torre model. It has as a generator an infinite regressive isol with a nice structural property relative to recursively enumerable sets and their extensions to the isols. What is then obtained is a nonstandard model in the isols of the Π0 2 fragment of Peano Arithmetic with the following property: Let T be a torre model. Let f be any recursive function, and let fΛ be its extension to the isols. If there is an isol A with fΛ(A)∈ T, then there is also an isol B∈ T with fΛ(B) = fΛ(A). (shrink)